Bureaucracies, Information, and International Crises: What You Know Depends on Where You Sit*

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Abstract

Whether international crises end peacefully depends upon the information that leaders possess. To understand how leaders acquire this information, I develop and test an informational theory of bureaucracies. Time-constrained leaders delegate information collection and provision tasks to senior advisers heading the state’s national security bureaucracies. A division of labor between bureaucracies breeds comparative specialization among affiliated advisers. Some specialize in adversaries’ political attributes (e.g., resolve) which are relatively hard to observe while others emphasize military attributes (e.g., force quantities) which are easier to observe. The type of information an adviser provides follows from her bureaucracy’s specialization. The argument challenges canonical accounts in which parochial interests cause advisers to endorse clashing policy prescriptions. Rather, where you sit affects the informational content you provide and uncertainty you express, not the policy you promote. To systematically evaluate the theory, I construct a corpus of 5,404 memos and meeting statements from US Cold War crises. Using automated text analysis and qualitative coding to measure advisory input, I find strong support for the argument. The findings highlight the informational role that bureaucracies and advisers play in shaping leaders’ beliefs during international crises.

*For fruitful discussions on this and related projects, I thank Muhammet Bas, Julie Faller, Jeff Frieden, Jeff Friedman, Rick Herrmann, Courtney Hillebrecht, Connor Huff, Iain Johnston, Tyler Jost, Josh Kertzer, David Lake, David Lindsey, John Marshall, Roseanne McManus, Ross Miller, Noah Nathan, Steve Rosen, Anne Sartori, Elizabeth Saunders, Ken Schultz, Dustin Tingley, Alex Weisiger, Ariel White, Melissa Willard-Foster, Keren Yarhi-Milo, George Yin, and audience members at APSA 2017, MPSA 2019, and Nebraska.

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1 Introduction

Information is often the root cause of international conflict. Crisis diplomacy can devolve into violence when opposing leaders have access to private information that they cannot credibly reveal to one another (Morrow 1989; Fearon 1995; Powell 1999; Fey and Ramsay 2011; Slantchev and Tarar 2011) or disagree about the implications of available information (Blainey 1988; Johnson 2004). Given the importance of information for explaining war and peace, it is vital to understand how leaders actually acquire it. Time constraints mean they cannot do this on their own and rarely have the requisite information at their fingertips. Instead, they delegate information-collection tasks to their senior advisers who convey this information during advisory processes. Advisers thus play a critical and often overlooked role in international politics by providing information that shapes leaders’ beliefs. This study brings advisers to the fore, stretching the locus of analysis beyond leaders who have assumed a privileged position in a wave of recent scholarship on their backgrounds (Colgan 2013; Horowitz and Stam 2014; Dafoe and Caughey 2016), institutional incentives (Chiozza and Goemans 2011; Croco 2011; Weeks 2014), and dispositions and beliefs (Hermann 1980; Saunders 2011; Yarhi-Milo 2014; Kertzer 2016; Whitlark 2017; Lupton 2018).

The senior advisers that leaders rely upon typically head the core bureaucracies of the national security apparatus. The bureaucratic role an adviser occupies affects the input she provides to the leader, but in a vastly different way than previously theorized. In my account, bureaucratic role affects the type of information advisers provide and uncertainty they express, not the policies that they promote. Leaders demand information; senior advisers can supply it. Akin to many principal-agent setups, agents (advisers) develop informational advantages over the principal (leader). In addition to being better informed than the leader, advisers are differentially informed compared to one another. Functional specialization between bureaucracies causes affiliated advisers to become differentially informed. Military advisers in, say, a ministry of defense, become relative experts on an adversary’s military attributes or characteristics. Foreign policy advisers in, say, a ministry of foreign affairs, become relative experts on an adversary’s political

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1Though see George (1980), Janis (1982), and Saunders (2017).

2See Bendor, Glazer and Hammond (2001) and Gailmard and Patty (2012) for reviews of these vast literatures.
attributes or characteristics. Advisers, consequently, emphasize different informational content when participating in deliberative processes. To be sure, differentiation is partial, not absolute and the walls of bureaucratic silos are permeable—military agencies employ political experts and vice-versa. Some bureaucracies, such as intelligence agencies, fall along a continuum between these ideal types. Nonetheless, bureaucratic affiliation heavily shapes the information advisers acquire and content they emphasize to the leader.

Bureaucratic position affects the uncertainty advisers express as well as the content they emphasize. These two implications are directly related. Some domains are relatively information rich while others tend to be information poor. I posit that information is more readily available on an adversary’s military traits, making them subject to less uncertainty. Analysts can often observe force quantities, postures, and locations. Political characteristics—such as an adversary’s resolve or domestic political landscape—are harder to assess and prone to greater uncertainty.

This study challenges the canonical account of how bureaucratic affiliation guides advisers’ input, as developed in Graham Allison’s work which has accumulated over 17,000 citations. Allison’s Bureaucratic Politics Model contends that bureaucracies’ parochial interests, for instance on budgetary matters, cause advisers’ preferences to diverge. Famously echoing Miles’ Law, “where you stand depends on where you sit” (Allison 1969, p. 711). Foreign policy advisers in a ministry of foreign affairs promote diplomatic solutions while military advisers (in or out of uniform) at a ministry of defense advocate militarily aggressive policies. I join a chorus of critics and challenge this account (Krasner 1972; Art 1973; Snyder and Diesing 1977; Welch 1992; Bendor and Hammond 1992) with a particular emphasis on its inappropriateness for describing the policy advisory process during crises. Its inappropriateness stems from two factors. First, advisory structures are hierarchical, not flat. Leaders sit atop this hierarchy equipped with tools to mitigate preference divergences among advisers. Second, adviser preferences often converge during crises.

To test this theory’s implications I examine advisory processes during US Cold War crises. I collect and analyze a corpus of documents from security deliberations at the highest levels of decision making, largely drawn from the Foreign Relations of the United States series (FRUS) which is the official historical record of the State Department. Employing qualitative methods and a variety

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3Citation total based on Allison (1969, 1971), Allison and Halperin (1972), and Allison and Zelikow (1999) according to Google Scholar as of September 5, 2019.
of automated text analysis tools, I generate measures capturing each bureaucracy’s advisory input for each crisis. Coupling speakers’ original and private words with capabilities to analyze texts at scale offers a new means to measure advisers’ emphases and beliefs. Specifically, I measure a bureaucracy’s advisory content (political vs. military), uncertainty, and relative hawkishness. The text-as-data approach builds on recent studies in international relations but differs in applying the method to internal advisory processes than rather external diplomatic messages (McManus 2017; Katagiri and Min 2019).

Three findings emerge. First, foreign policy advisers, as embodied by those at the State Department, are twice as likely to discuss an adversary’s political attributes compared to colleagues from other bureaucracies. Second, these advisers express more uncertainty than those with different affiliations. Third, an adviser’s bureaucratic role does not predict the policy positions he advocates. Diplomats are as likely as their counterparts from Defense to endorse the more militarily aggressive policy response. The findings strongly suggest bureaucratic role matters, but it matters in a different way than the conventional wisdom suggests. Consistent with my theory, bureaucratic affiliation affects the type of information advisers provide and the certainty accompanying that advice, but not the hawkishness of the policies they champion.

The theory and results elucidate (1) how advisory processes affect the quality of leaders’ decisions and (2) the mechanics of information transmission. First, the results show the danger of leaders marginalizing key bureaucracies in the national security apparatus. Because bureaucracies bring distinct expertise, curtailing a bureaucracy’s input causes leaders to miss important pieces of information. For instance, preceding the Iraq War George W. Bush limited the State Department’s input and neglected its expertise. Marginalization distorted the administration’s assessments of postwar stability. The administration, as a result, marched to war with an incomplete and inaccurate conception of what political end-states could be achieved through force and at what cost. Second, an informational account of bureaucracies provides a real-world grounding for how information guides leaders’ strategic choices. Much past work suggests that a leader’s information follows from the strategic environment—such as, whether information is complete and what signals opponents send (for instance, Lake and Powell (1999); Powell (2017)). My ac-

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4For instance as contained in the Future of Iraq Project. On flaws in postwar planning more generally, see Ricks (2006); Bensahel (2007); Lake (2010); Rapport (2012); Saunders (2017).
count highlights the mechanics of how leaders might actually go about acquiring this information. Others have illuminated information sources that leaders privilege (Hall 2015; Yarhi-Milo 2014), advisory ordering principles (George 1980; Bendor and Hammond 1992), leader and adviser personal attributes (Saunders 2017), and civil-military dimensions of information provision (Huntington 1957; Feaver 2003; Brooks 2008). An emphasis on bureaucratic role, especially among civilian advisers, is a novel one that can integrate bureaucratic dynamics into broader theories of international relations, such as those stressing information and uncertainty as key variables for war and peace.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. It first explicates Allison’s Bureaucratic Politics Model, the implications that follow, and various counterarguments. Next, it develops the informational theory of bureaucracies, explaining why bureaucratic role shapes advisory content and uncertainty. The following section presents the research design, describing case and document selection criteria as well as the measurement strategies, which include supervised learning, dictionary approaches, and qualitative coding. I then present results, consider alternative explanations and generalizability, and provide intuitions for when advisory processes might increase the risk of conflict. A final section concludes, tracing the implications of leaders who do not value information or expertise.

2 Bureaucratic Preferences: Sitting and Standing

What does existing scholarship tell us about how bureaucracies affect advisory processes during interstate crises? Many studies speak to crisis advisory processes generally, analyzing how decision-making bodies are structured (Hermann and Preston 1994; Hermann 2001) or endorsing optimal arrangements such as multiple advocacy (George 1980; George and Stern 2002), overlapping responsibilities (Rudalevige 2005; Dickinson 2005), or having leaders and advisers with extensive experience (Saunders 2017). Others document pathologies that might emerge such as groupthink (Janis 1982; Herek, Janis and Huth 1987). While speaking to advisory processes, bureaucratic affiliations play a limited role in these accounts and consequently they do not generate clear implications for how input from a secretary of defense and a secretary of state might differ.

The most prominent theory that does stipulate how bureaucratic affiliation affects advisory
input assumes preference heterogeneity among advisers. As first developed in Allison (1969), and reframed and expanded upon in subsequent work (Allison 1971; Allison and Halperin 1972; Allison and Zelikow 1999), advisers’ parochial interests dictate or, more modestly, affect the policies they endorse.\(^5\) Competing preferences drive advisers and even leaders to engage in a political battle to shift policy in directions that advantage their bureaucracies.

The Bureaucratic Politics Model produces testable implications for the behavior of advisers during interstate crises. Intuitively, advisers should endorse policies that advance their bureaucracies’ interests. This rolls back the inquiry to one of discerning bureaucracies’ interests. Interests on budgetary matters are straightforward: advisers endorse policies that will bring more money to their bureaucracy. Interests on crisis policy choices are somewhat less immediate (though those policy choices might have budgetary implications). A fair reading might conclude that diplomats or foreign policy advisers, such as from a ministry of foreign affairs, should prefer relatively peaceful policies. In contrast, military advisers, such as from a ministry of defense, should prefer relatively militaristic policies. An even more generous reading might restrict the latter category to exclude advisers in uniform, focusing only on civilian defense advisers. Military personnel have cross-cutting considerations that might diminish the effect of parochialism. Risk perceptions, cost sensitivities (Huntington 1957), combat experiences (Horowitz and Stam 2014), preexisting dispositions (Jost, Meshkin and Schub N.d.), mission preferences (Gelpi and Feaver 2002), and concerns about political constraints (Feaver and Gelpi 2004) all affect military attitudes toward the use of force. Focusing on gaps between civilian advisers affiliated with different bureaucracies skirts the complications introduced by these documented civilian-military differences and stacks the deck in favor of Allison’s account.

Critics might view this reading of the Bureaucratic Politics Model’s implications as overly sweeping, noting that parochial interests are contextually dependent. Marsh and Jones (2017) provides a nice example. The study documents competing interests weighing on the State Department before the Afghanistan surge and Libya strikes to shed light on Secretary Clinton’s hawkish stances. This nuance, while valuable for any given case, undercuts the theoretical power and

\(^5\)For Allison and Halperin (1972) (p. 44), “government leaders have competitive, not homogenous interests; priorities and perceptions are shaped by positions.” Allison and Zelikow (1999, p. 307) tempers the prediction, stipulating that where you stand “is substantially affected by” where you sit.
utility of the Bureaucratic Politics Model. At best it circumscribes our ability to make testable predictions. At worst it renders the theory unfalsifiable, forcing scholars to infer bureaucratic interests from post hoc analyses of their policy prescriptions.

Allison’s parochial theory of bureaucratic politics yields the following testable implication:

**Parochial Theory Expectation 1**: During crises, civilian foreign policy advisers (i.e., those in foreign affairs ministries) endorse less militarily aggressive policies than civilian advisers with different substantive assignments.

Critics raise many reasons to doubt the merits of the Bureaucratic Politics Model (Krasner 1972; Art 1973; Snyder and Diesing 1977; Welch 1992; Bendor and Hammond 1992). Several factors mitigate the presence and influence of parochial preference divergences during international crises. First, leaders have tools to address the issue. Leaders who can select their advisers choose allies with aligned preferences which can supersede bureaucratic affinities (Krehbiel 1991; Bendor and Hammond 1992). Krasner (1972) makes the point succinctly, “The most important “action-channel” in the government is the President’s ear. The President has a major role in determining who whispers in it.” Senior advisers are likely “attuned” to the leader’s interests (Betts 1991, p. 40). Even when leaders do not select allies, they have tools to dampen parochialism. Sanctioning, for instance, can elicit truthful advisory input. If advisers care whether the leader thinks them competent or retains their services, then incentives exist for them to offer the best advice given the information they have, rather than pursue bureaucratic interests (Meirowitz 2006). Leaders can dismiss advisers whose performance they deem inadequate. President Kennedy’s dismissal of two senior CIA officials, Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell, after the Bay of Pigs is illustrative.

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6 For Welch (1992) and Bendor and Hammond (1992), it is unclear whether the Bureaucratic Politics Model is actually a model of bureaucracies or of the individuals in senior positions. Allison (1969, p. 709) assigns causal importance to the fact that “metabolisms differ.” This sounds like an individual rather than bureaucracy-level explanation, barring intriguing selection or cafeteria effects.

7 The relevance and utility of adviser selection diminishes under some conditions. Leaders may be constrained in their ability to select advisers—for instance, in a parliamentary coalition government (Preston and ’t Hart 1999). Also, a competence versus loyalty tradeoff can undermine preference convergence Lewis (2011).

8 Extreme sanctioning, such as personalist dictators assassinating adviser’s, alters the dynamics. Advisers will likely converge on views aligned with their perception of the leader’s preferences. Former regime members in Saddam’s Iraq indicate that no one dared challenge Saddam’s narrative before the Iraq War (Lake 2010).
Second, when contemplating the use of military force, preferences are especially likely to converge on some conception of promoting general welfare of the state. Allison (1969) (p. 711) hints at this inverse relationship between stakes and parochialism. Third, beyond deductive logic, prior empirical analysis (Snyder and Diesing 1977; Rhodes 1994) and several anecdotes suggest that preference divergences which do emerge are not ex ante predictable on the basis of bureaucratic position. Secretary of State Clinton’s hawkish stance on intervening in Libya as compared to Secretary of Defense Gates’ dovish one is a recent counter-example. Advisers may compete to influence policy but not in the consistent fashion that a parochial theory suggests.

I anticipate that the parochial theory receives little empirical support. This expectation applies to advisory input during interstate crises. It does not speak to long-term strategy choices, the day-to-day conduct of foreign policy, or the implementation of a leader’s orders during crises.

3 An Informational Theory of Bureaucracies and Crises

I develop an affirmative informational theory of bureaucracies. It specifies the types of information leaders typically seek, how easy each type is to collect, and who provides it to leaders.

The Information Leaders Need

Richard Neustadt (1990, p. 128-129) wrote of the US context, “A president is helped by what he gets into his mind. His first essential need is information.” This is especially true during international crises when leaders must assess what each side can expect to achieve in a military conflict and at what cost. With war as an outside option, optimal strategy decisions—such as how generous or stingy to be in crisis diplomacy—hinge upon expected payoffs to fighting. The probability of military victory and the costs of fighting are key determinants of these payoffs and thus affect which peaceful settlements are preferable to conflict (Blainey 1988; Fearon 1995; Powell 1999). Further unpacking these elements offers a helpful framework for understanding advisory processes. Both the probability of victory and war costs depend on military and political attributes. A distinction along these broad lines—military versus political—elucidates the information leaders must collect to guide their policy choices during crises. I contend the political is harder to assess than the military and thus subject to more uncertainty.
Military attributes affect the probability of victory and the costs incurred during fighting. These attributes include the quantity and quality of an adversary’s military assets (Friedberg 1987), its defense spending (Lebovic 1995), its personnel and their training, its doctrine and force posture (Biddle 2004; Narang 2014), and a net assessment of how these characteristics interact with a state’s own military capabilities and doctrine (Posen 1984; Cohen 1988; Rosen 1991). Leaders benefit from information on these elements to develop an accurate picture of the crisis landscape.

The observable nature of many military characteristics aids the information gathering and assessment process. While they are imperfectly observable, imperfect signals can yield valuable information. Military demonstrations (e.g., North Korean tests of new missile technologies) and publicly available documentation (e.g., Soviet pronouncements of military personnel reductions in the mid-1950s) facilitate assessments, whether quantitative or qualitative. Aerial surveillance technologies provide information for simple bean-counting or monitoring opponent positioning and posture (e.g., US detection of Soviet missiles in Cuba). Assessing opponent doctrine poses a tougher estimative challenge, but states can glean insights from recent conflicts and pronouncements. Hence, the tradition of non-combatants monitoring military engagements (e.g., US observers of the Crimean War evaluating the effect of technological developments on combat dynamics) and carefully studying adversary military doctrine. A net assessment of opposing forces, which moves beyond one-sided analysis, is inherently more difficult. States rely on qualitative insights, historical studies, and simulations. Information on military characteristics is not always abundant. States vary in transparency levels and may even have incentives to mask information (Meirowitz and Sartori 2008; Slantchev 2010). While acknowledging variation, military information is often available and obtainable. Greater information allows advisers and leaders to form higher certainty assessments over these attributes.

An adversary’s political attributes, which similarly affect both the probability of victory and war costs, are more difficult to assess because they are harder to observe. Limited observability means limited information which implies a high degree of uncertainty. Three forms of political traits illuminate the general point.

*Resolve*, or a state’s steadfastness to a policy despite “temptations to back down” (Kertzer 2016), is the prototypical political attribute that affects expected conflict payoffs. Resolve encompasses an array of concepts, such as a state’s willingness to use force at all or the costs it will endure
during the course of using force. Resolve can also relate to the value the adversary places on the issue in dispute. A high valuation—akin to high resolve—diminishes the utility loss of suffering wartime costs. Unfortunately for those tasked with making assessments, resolve is typically unobservable ex ante. Leaders and advisers employ various techniques to assess opponent resolve before conflict, often with limited success. Decision makers may look to an adversary’s verbal claims. Unfortunately, these claims yield valuable information only under circumscribed conditions given the adversary’s incentives to claim a high valuation of the issue (Fearon 1995). Leaders may rely on dispositional traits of the adversary’s leader (Kertzer 2016). If we could infer personal attributes of the adversary’s leader—e.g., risk tolerance or patience—we could be more precise in the assessment. However, this difficult task is subject to high uncertainty, particularly in the midst of a crisis. Perhaps an opponent’s prior behavior could shed light on their resolve in future interactions. However, it is unclear whether leaders can (and should) infer an adversary’s resolve today based on its past actions (Press 2005; Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo 2015). Contextual differences across space and time may limit the applicability of prior interactions for gauging today’s likely responses. Assessing resolve is difficult even after conflict begins because it is unclear what the opponent is willing to endure. Seven years after US combat troops arrived, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Moorer was still surprised that the “North Vietnamese seem to be able to take unlimited losses.” Resolve is rarely amenable to high-certainty assessments due to a general dearth of information.

**Domestic unity.** Great powers repeatedly attempt to influence which regimes hold power in states throughout the world (O’Rourke 2018). Domestic unity is central to assessing the prospects of military efforts toward this end. Widespread domestic opposition to an incumbent increases the prospects for his successful displacement. So too do hostile elite factions. For instance, high-level military defections against Arbenz’s regime were vital for victory in CIA’s 1954 operation in Guatemala. Tribal dynamics in Afghanistan have proven critical in US efforts to support a

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9Cheap talk can, under some conditions, credibly convey information (Sartori 2002; Kurizaki 2007; Trager 2010). Alternatively, adversaries may send costly signals to convey resolve (Fearon 1994, 1997; Yarhi-Milo, Kertzer and Renshon forthcoming). However, states often struggle to provide relevant costly signals during a crisis.

functioning central government in Kabul. As with resolve, domestic unity is frequently difficult
to observe. Adversaries, particularly autocracies, often mask or inflate their domestic support.
Limited information means that domestic unity is a source of high uncertainty.

*Transforming military gains to political ends.* An opponent’s broader political landscape affects
post-conflict planning which has ramifications for translating military accomplishments into po-
litical objectives. Force is an instrument to achieve desired political end-states. Military success
must be translated into the objectives, such as territory or preferred policy outcomes, for which
the conflict was fought. Theories of war often abstract away this complication and assume com-
bat winners can impose their preferred political settlement. Most conflicts fall short of the ideal
type of absolute war with absolute victory. Spoils rarely automatically accrue to the combat victor.
Leader beliefs about an adversary’s political landscape inform estimates about translating military
gains into political gains. For instance, estimates of the US payoff to the Iraq War rested on beliefs
about what postwar policies it could install in Baghdad. This in turn depended on assessments
of Iraqi military attributes, crucial for *displacing* Saddam, but also Iraqi political attributes such as
the post-conflict political landscape, crucial for *replacing* Saddam. Translation difficulties between
military and political outcomes are hard to assess beforehand.\(^\text{11}\)

Assessing military and political attributes of the adversary allows leaders to estimate the ex-
pected value of conflict. International politics is often a realm of informational scarcity. Such
scarcity is especially pronounced for political attributes. Accordingly, uncertainty is typically
higher for an adversary’s political attributes than for its military attributes.

**The Information Advisers Provide**

Leaders use information on both military and political attributes of the adversary to assess
what can be achieved through force and at what cost. Due to time and attention constraints
they typically lack the requisite information. Burdens across policy domains mean leaders are
rarely self-reliant during crises. Instead, they turn to their senior advisers. Thus, a leader (prin-
cipal) delegates information collection and provision tasks to advisers (agents). Compared to the

\(^{11}\)Political objectives vary in their translation uncertainties. Installing a new form of government in Baghdad is
subject to greater uncertainty than occupying newly acquired territory in the Sinai. See Edelstein (2008) and Sullivan
(2007) among others for more on securing political objectives through force.
leader, these agents become better, though not necessary completely, informed about adversary attributes. Advisers know more than the leader but are still frequently uncertain about adversary traits because uncertainty permeates much of international politics. Information asymmetries between a principal and agent are fixtures of politics as scholars of Congress and many other domains have long recognized. Yet, these informational dynamics play a limited role in the systematic study of international security with notable excepts in the civil-military literature (Feaver 2003; Brooks 2008) and Saunders (2017).

In addition to being better informed, advisers are differentially informed. These advisers lead or reside within the core bureaucracies of the national security apparatus. A prototypical setup entails a division of labor between bureaucracies to foster expertise and efficiency (March and Simon 1958). Functional specialization between bureaucracies causes advisers to become differentially informed about adversary attributes. As an abstraction, military advisers from a ministry of defense are relative experts on an adversary’s military attributes (e.g., the quality of its capabilities) while foreign policy advisers from a ministry of foreign affairs are relative experts on an adversary’s political attributes (e.g., its resolve or domestic political landscape). Military advisers study opponents’ doctrines, arms development programs, troop levels, force locations, and fighting power. Soviet Defense Minister Malinovsky reportedly stressed to Khrushchev that Cuban forces could withstand a US assault for only three or four days during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Foreign policy advisers acquire a distinct information set to perform their assigned tasks. Embassies abroad provide insights into jockeying among domestic factions. Ambassador Sullivan’s cable, “Thinking the Unthinkable,” casting (belated) doubt on the Shah’s long term viability is a famous example.12 Amidst the Dien Bien Phu crisis, British Foreign Secretary Eden warned US officials that “Communism in Asia cannot (repeat not) be checked by military means alone. The problem is as much political as military.”13 Due to their substantive remit, foreign policy advisers develop expertise in an adversary’s political characteristics.

An adviser’s informational expertise and emphasis follows from the substantive mission of her bureaucracy. Granted, there is expertise overlap between bureaucracies. Foreign policy ad-

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12 Telegram from American Embassy Tehran to Secretary of State, 11/29/78, NLC-16-57-3-21-6, Jimmy Carter Library.
13 State Department Telegram from Geneva to the Secretary of State, 30 April, 1954, Dulles – April 1954 (1), Box 2, Dulles-Herter Series, Eisenhower Files, Eisenhower Presidential Library.
visers analyze military information in addition to more purely political information. And the reverse holds as well. Some agencies sit between these ideal-type extremes. The theory’s implications have less bite when advisory structures involve duplicative and overlapping responsibilities, which some states may legally require and some leaders may prefer. However, in expectation bureaucracies serve differentiated tasks and develop differentiated expertise as a result. The process of providing information to the leader augments these information divergences. What advisers emphasize when speaking to a leader likely follows from the adviser’s assigned task. Limited “face time” with the executive incentivizes advisers to speak to the issues in which they have specialized, potentially unique, knowledge. Beyond an adviser’s incentives to stick to his area of expertise, leaders may reprimand those who do not. President Obama reportedly criticized Secretary of State Kerry for bringing him military plans for Syria (Goldberg 2016), which was outside the purview of Kerry’s role. Straying beyond core competencies invites blowback and, even worse, can provide leaders with inaccurate or distorted information.

Delegation generates informational asymmetries between leaders and their advisers. Comparative specialization among the advisers generates differentiated areas of expertise and emphasis. A testable implication follows:

**Informational Theory Expectation 1**: When advising leaders, foreign policy advisers discuss political (as opposed to military) attributes of the adversary more often than advisers with different substantive assignments.

Advisers tasked with analyzing and conducting foreign policy are more likely to discuss political, as opposed to military, attributes of the adversary when given an audience with the leader. A relative dearth of information makes political attributes subject to greater uncertainty than military attributes. A second implication follows:

**Informational Theory Expectation 2**: When advising leaders, foreign policy advisers express greater uncertainty than advisers with different substantive assignments.

Figure 1 summarizes the theorized adviser delegation and specialization as well as the variation in uncertainty levels for assessing political versus military attributes. To fix ideas, consider this implication in the US context. State Department officials are a useful proxy for those I term
foreign policy advisers. The first expectation claims they are more likely to discuss political dimensions of an adversary and the second posits that this substantive emphasis, coupled with the inherent difficulty of forming high-certainty assessments on the matter, makes State Department officials express a low degree of certainty. Bureaucracies thus diverge in the information they provide, not the policies they champion.

4 Cases, Evidence, and Measures of Adviser Input

This section describes the research design for testing the empirical implications. Generating measures for empirical analyses proceeds in three steps. The first identifies a set of cases. The second specifies documentary evidence on the advisory processes during these cases. The third uses these documents to generate measures for three dimensions of advisory input: content, certainty, and policy prescription.

Cases

The analysis draws on 61 US crises during the Cold War from the Eisenhower to Carter administrations. Bounding the analysis to the US during the Cold War holds potential confounding variables relatively constant. First, keeping the state fixed mitigates concerns that variation in institutional structures drives the results. US institutional arrangements were relatively static as the analysis begins after the 1947 National Security Act and ends before the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols
Act altered the military chain of command. Second, the background demographics of the individual advisers were remarkably stable. Gender, education, and race, all of which could affect advisory input, were near constants. Third, bipolarity prevailed throughout this period, albeit with stretches of relative detente and animosity.

Practical considerations—such as the availability of evidence—also recommend a US Cold War focus. The analysis requires access to information about advisory processes at the highest levels of decision making. Classification considerations mandate a lag between the events and their study. Pertinent declassified documents exist through the Carter administration. Additionally, the US provides a uniquely rich documentary record. More broadly, the global ramifications of US behavior make its advisory characteristics of general interest. Nevertheless, the context raises questions about generalizability which I address later.

I identify opportunities to use force which represent instances in which the president and senior advisers considered and discussed using US force to strike abroad. The case qualification criteria is closest in spirit to that in Betts (1991), which similarly studies adviser behavior during times when both peace and conflict were realistic options. Relatively strict qualification criteria help preclude smaller incidents that do not precipitate leader-level deliberations and thus are ill-suited for evaluating the hypotheses.

Two sources contribute the majority of cases. First, I include crises from the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set with the US as an actor (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1998). ICB defines a crisis as a “situation deriving from change in a state’s internal or external environment which gives rise to decision makers’ perceptions of threat to basic values, finite time for response, and the likelihood of involvement in military hostilities [emphasis in original]” (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1982, p. 383). Second, I include major military mobilizations that Blechman and Kaplan (1978) (p. 50) code as level one and two uses of force. The authors define these as:

- **Level 1**: Use of strategic nuclear unit plus at least one “major” force component;
- **Level 2**: Two or three “major” force components used, but not strategic nuclear units,

where a “major” unit is (1) two or more aircraft carrier task groups, (2) more than one army battalion, or (3) one or more combat wings. Directing many military assets toward a possible conflict location indicates serious discussions about using force. Importantly, asset mobilization
does not imply the actual use of force. Some mobilizations ended peacefully while others did not. Together, these two sources contribute 46 cases. An additional 15 observations come from several sources including some lower-level military mobilizations, confrontations from the Militarized Interstate Dispute data set (Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer 2004), and opportunities to strike the Soviet Union and China’s nascent nuclear programs.

The Supporting Information (SI) lists the opportunities to use force (which I use interchangeably with ‘crises’) and provides information about the precipitating context. Some cases concern potential new uses of force—such as the 1958 turbulence in Lebanon, 1969 North Korean EC-121 spy plane incident, and 1975 Cambodian Mayaguez seizure. Others capture pivotal moments to potentially expand the scope of ongoing uses of force—such as 1953 deliberations surrounding the Korean War armistice and 1971 invasion of Laos during the Vietnam War. Sample censorship, in the sense of excluding cases where using force never received leader-level scrutiny, could introduce bias favoring the hypotheses if the relationship of interest is even more pronounced under conditions favoring sample inclusion. However, this inferential threat is likely limited. Advisers’ relative areas of specialization are unlikely to switch when under presidential scrutiny.

Evidence: Constructing a Corpus

Measuring advisory input requires access to details about crisis advisory processes. While no existing data set systematically provides this information across many cases, rich qualitative case studies do an admirable job reconstructing advisory processes.14 Inspired by these examples, I use a new approach to directly capture the private words of senior advisers at scale. I collect documentary evidence from presidential-level deliberations about using force. Declassified documents published through the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series, the official documentary record of the State Department, constitute the core sources for the analysis. FRUS volumes supplement State Department files with materials from presidential libraries, the Department of Defense, National Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency, and other agencies and individuals involved in crafting US foreign policy. Documents include National Security Council meeting minutes and transcripts, intra-elite memos (such as from Kissinger to Nixon), and min-

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14 Among many others, some fine examples include George and Smoke (1974); Van Evera (1984); Betts (1991); Hermann and Preston (1994); Marsh (2014); Saunders (2017).
utes from elite conversations in settings both unstructured (such as ad hoc White House meetings) and structured (such as presidential briefings from the Joint Chiefs of Staff). FRUS provides access to private statements that likely reflect sincere beliefs. For instance, when opting to intervene in the Laotian Civil War in 1964, Johnson told advisers “we should go ahead with the mission but that he had doubts about the action.” Presidents rarely voice such reservations publicly.

I select and prune documents to include only those portions directly pertinent to the theory. Retained portions concern political or military attributes relevant for assessing potential conflict outcomes during the crises. Less cautious approaches that include all documents in a FRUS volume risk having the analysis swamped by noise or letting irrelevant documents undermine measurement validity. I restrict the corpus to memos sent to or by the president and transcripts from meetings which the president attended or was briefed on. Given his primacy in the decision-making process, I focus on only those advisory opinions to which he was privy. All transcripts are split into speaker-specific texts; thus, a Nixon-Kissinger dialogue produces Nixon texts and Kissinger texts.

In total, the corpus includes 5,404 speech acts or statements by an advisor or president. These come from 382 distinct documents with 176 unique speakers. Memos (versus meeting statements) constitute 3% of all speech acts, but tend to be longer and thus represent 29% of total words in the corpus. The extent of adviser input within the corpus accords with the historical record. As shown in Table 1, text volume in the corpus mirrors the well-known prominence of key advisers, such as John Foster Dulles, Kissinger, and Brzezinski.

Two potential drawbacks to using FRUS—classification and selective document inclusion—merit attention. Redacted segments within available texts pose little inferential risk because they

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15 Because FRUS volumes for the Carter-era are incomplete, I gathered documents from the Carter Presidential Library and National Security Archive. Documents akin to those in FRUS are widely available. Partial exceptions include limited records immediately preceding the April 1980 Iran Hostage rescue attempt and from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I supplement FRUS with transcripts from the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm) from the Cuban Missile Crisis.


17 The 1976 North Korean Tree Trimming Incident meets the sampling criteria but is excluded because FRUS does not contain documents involving the president.
Table 1: Influential Speakers by Administration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Eisenhower</th>
<th>Kennedy</th>
<th>Johnson</th>
<th>Nixon</th>
<th>Ford</th>
<th>Carter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dulles (John)</td>
<td>McNamara</td>
<td>Bundy</td>
<td>Kissinger</td>
<td>Kissinger</td>
<td>Brzezinski</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radford</td>
<td>Taylor</td>
<td>McNamara</td>
<td>Laird</td>
<td>Colby</td>
<td>Turner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dulles (Allen)</td>
<td>Rusk</td>
<td>Ball</td>
<td>Newsom</td>
<td>Schlesinger</td>
<td>Vance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cutler</td>
<td>Komer</td>
<td>Rusk</td>
<td>Rogers</td>
<td>Jones</td>
<td>Muskie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith (Walter)</td>
<td>Bundy</td>
<td>Rostow</td>
<td>Moorer</td>
<td>Wyand</td>
<td>Brown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stassen</td>
<td>McCone</td>
<td>McCone</td>
<td>Helms</td>
<td>Rockefeller</td>
<td>Sullivan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morgan</td>
<td>Schlesinger</td>
<td>Wheeler</td>
<td>Haig</td>
<td>Rumsfeld</td>
<td>Aaron</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Speakers with the most text by administration.

typically concern targeting location details or covert sources rather than broad strategic considerations. Another concern is that entire documents remain classified or that FRUS historians excluded certain types of documents. Assessing either possibility is difficult at scale. A highly publicized dispute over declassification of materials for the FRUS volume on the 1954 Guatemala operation alleviates some concerns.\(^\text{18}\) It is reassuring that this one case is well known and researcher complaints generally have not reached a similar volume since. Slower and more restrictive declassification at the Pentagon or CIA could also skew the composition of FRUS volumes. However, this only generates bias favoring the hypotheses if in the excluded documents the non-State Department officials consistently address political (vs. military) matters and/or express high uncertainty.

Measuring Advisory Input

Raw inputs—speech acts from memos and transcripts—must be transformed into analytically useful measures. Text analysis tools, which provide a replicable means of distilling advisory input from a mass of private statements, enable this transformation for measuring content and certainty. Because these tools are less suited for measuring advisory policy prescriptions, I qualitatively code the relative hawkishness of State and Defense Department officials for each case.

I generate measures at the bureaucracy-crisis level by aggregating the input of advisers affiliated with five bureaucracies: State, Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and National Security Council (NSC) or White House staff.\(^\text{19}\) I operationalize for-

\(^{18}\)See McAllister et al. (2015) for a description of the controversy and the politics of FRUS.

\(^{19}\)The final category includes vice presidents. Treasury officials feature in some deliberations, but assume a more limited role than those from the five listed bureaucracies.
eign policy advisers who most clearly specialize in an adversary’s political attributes as State Department officials. Defense Department officials and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who I distinguish between for reasons that will become clear, are specialists in the adversary’s military attributes. These officials serve as proxies for the ‘ideal’ types. CIA and the National Security Council staff (plus other White House advisers) lie along a continuum between them and consequently produce ambiguous empirical expectations.20

Adviser Content: Political or Military

Testing the informational theory of bureaucracies requires a measure of whether advisory content concerned military or political considerations. Supervised learning techniques, which classify texts into pre-specified categories, offer an accurate and scalable method for this measurement task (Hastie, Tibshirani and Friedman 2001). Supervised methods follow a straightforward process. Human coders classify a subset of texts as either political or military. An algorithm uses this training set to “learn” which features (typically words) of texts are associated with each category. The algorithm then uses these features to sort the remaining texts between the categories. I use Naive Bayes, one of the simplest supervised learning methods (Maron and Kuhns 1960). The SI describes the method in greater detail—following the presentations in Grimmer and Stewart (2013) and Nielsen (N.d.). Using the method, I generate a continuous Content Text Score that measures the extent to which a text concerns political or military content. Positive values indicate political texts while negative values indicate military texts. Scores are scaled by the length of each text because longer texts tend to produce more extreme scores. I also create a binary variable, Political, which codes texts as 1 if the Content Text Score is positive, and 0 otherwise.

Training Set. Speaker texts in the full corpus range from a single word spoken during a meeting to memos exceeding 4,000 words. Variation poses a coding challenge as short texts make it difficult to discern the expressed content while long texts exceed coders’ realistic attention spans. To provide some uniformity, I split longer texts into portions containing between 30 and 250 words. This length proved sufficient to judge content yet remain manageable. The training set consists of a random subset of memos and transcripts. In total, it has 475 texts representing approximately 20% of the corpus’ total word count. To guard against coding bias, I remove identifying infor-

20On NSC responsibilities and their expansion over time, see Preston (2001); Destler (1980); George and Stern (2002).
mation on the speaker’s name and bureaucratic affiliation and then classify each text as either political or military.

Classification rules followed from the theory and were refined through iteratively applying these rules to the actual texts. Military texts address military capabilities, the quality of forces, force locations, and how the interaction of opposing forces might unfold. In practice, texts frequently referred to opponent, allied, and the United States’ own military forces and options. Political texts address the opponent’s commitment to the issues at stake (resolve), the domestic political landscape in the relevant state, the popularity of that state’s leader, or challenges involved with translating the application of force to desired political end-states. Some documents refer to US resolve, as well as the reputational effects for the US of abstaining from versus entering in to conflict. Example texts in the SI typify content from each category.

Overall, I coded 61% and 39% of the training set as military and political texts, respectively. A research assistant also coded the full training set. She produced identical codings for 82% of the 475 texts with further measures of inter-coder reliability provided in the SI. Several standard preprocessing steps were performed before proceeding with the analysis. These include removing numbers, punctuation, and capitalization as well as stemming words.

**Validation.** Two validity checks provide strong evidence that the Naive Bayes classifier captures the substantive content of interest. The first check is descriptive and suggestive, the second more systematic. First, I examine the words that most distinguish between the categories in the training set. This offers a sanity check that military documents do indeed pertain to military factors and the same is true for political documents. Figure 2 plots the 25 terms with the highest relative frequency for each category—that is, those terms with the greatest differentials between the categories. It provides surface plausibility for the measurement strategy. The left side of the plot shows terms, or word stems, that most distinguish military texts: “forc,” “attack,” “general,” “nuclear,” “target,” and “strike.” Word stems to the right are indicative of political texts. Given that the political category spans a wider range of substantive topics, words tend to be less discriminating as compared to the military category. Instead, state leaders—“Khrushchev,” “Nasser,” “Faysal”—help distinguish these texts, as do references to “govern” and “talk.” The most telling term for political texts, “will,” has multiple connotations. It could relate to projections of how actors will respond to stimuli or to their willpower or resolve. Each connotation concerns political, as opposed to

19
military, content.

Cross-validation, the second validity check, offers systematic evidence supporting the measure’s appropriateness. I perform 10-fold cross-validation which randomly partitions the training set into 10 equally sized groups. The exercise sequentially drops each group, trains the model using the remaining nine groups, and then applies the classifier to the withheld group. This produces out-of-sample predictions for each text in the training set and avoids overfitting the classifier.

The classifier performs well on several metrics. It accurately categorizes 88% of the texts. Other diagnostics for evaluating classification performance, such as $F$-scores, are similarly supportive and further discussed in the SI. Beyond high accuracy, analysis shows that inaccurate classifica-
tions were rarely far off the mark. They clustered close to the cut point between the two categories on the continuous Content Text Score.

**Application.** After validating the approach on the training set, I apply the algorithm to the full corpus at the bureaucracy level of analysis. This involves aggregating all text from a bureaucracy’s officials during a single crisis—for instance, from all Defense Department officials during the Mayaguez seizure—and applying the classifier to this aggregated text block. Each bureaucracy observation receives a continuous Content Text Score (mean= −0.12) and dichotomous Political content indicator (mean= 0.29).

**Adviser Uncertainty**

Evaluating Informational Theory Expectation 2 requires a measure of assessment certainty. Dictionary methods offer a simple means for summarizing text attributes. I use the “If” dictionary from the Harvard General Inquirer, which linguists constructed to measure uncertain tones in speech and writing. It includes words such as “approximately,” “doubt,” “possibility,” and “unpredictable.” Two reasons argue in favor a dictionary method over a supervised learning method. First, there is a pre-existing dictionary of words that connote uncertainty across many contexts, including for the context of crisis advisory processes. Second, the classification concept is far subtler compared to the military/political distinction. Words delineating between military and political content are frequent and stark, as seen in Figure 2. Words distinguishing certain from uncertain assessments are less frequent and obvious, making it harder for a learning method to discern distinguishing features. The 96 words in the uncertainty dictionary constitute just over 5% of words in the corpus. In comparison, the 96 words that most distinguish military texts constitute nearly 22% of the words in the corpus training set. The relative scarcity of uncertainty words means that other elements of the texts likely swamp the uncertainty features, thus limiting classification accuracy.

Following prior work, the measure reflects the relative frequency of uncertain words as a

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21Dictionary is available at [http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~inquirer/](http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~inquirer/). I add “risk” to the dictionary because decision makers often voice uncertainty by invoking risks.

22See Grimmer and Stewart (2013) for a summary of the approach and McManus (2017) for a noteworthy application to the study of international security.
percentage of total words. It assigns a score of one to all uncertain words found in the dictionary, sums across a given text, and divides by the text’s total word count. As with the adviser content measure, the uncertainty measure is generated at the bureaucracy-crisis level. The SI provides an example text with words in the uncertainty dictionary italicized.

Overall, speaker texts with at least 30 words have a mean uncertainty score of 5.3% and standard deviation of 3.0%. The SI describes two tactics for measurement validation—a hand-coded subset and a series of paired comparisons—which both corroborate the measure’s merit.

**Adviser Policy Prescriptions: Hawks and Doves**

Assessing the competing Parochial Theory requires a measure of each bureaucracy’s policy stance during each opportunity to use force. I take a qualitative approach, measuring relative hawkishness on a three-point scale, to evaluate whether bureaucratic affiliations drive advisers’ policy prescriptions. I restrict the focus to civilian advisers from the State and Defense Departments. This offers a fair test of the theoretical contention. State and Defense represent the extreme bureaucracies in terms of parochial benefits to diplomacy versus force. CIA and NSC have mixed interests that produce ambiguous implications. Additionally, a strictly civilian approach sidesteps the aforementioned complicating issues from civil-military relations, which scholars have already studied (Betts 1991; Feaver and Gelpi 2004). Moreover, it disaggregates the “civil” side of civil-military dynamics.

I code relative aggressiveness based on FRUS, the secondary literature, and memoirs of participants when necessary. What constitutes the hawkish position varies by crisis. Some debates concern using conventional versus nuclear forces. Others concern the size of arms shipments to send to an ally. The concept is not amenable to automated text measurement because subsets of words that represent the aggressive policy in one case may represent the dovish posture in another. For each case, I evaluate the positions of the Secretaries of State and Defense as well as senior officials in each bureaucracy. Following Betts (1991), the measure takes one of three values. Either Defense is more hawkish, there is no substantive difference, or State is more hawkish. The SI describes all sources and codings.
5 Results: Adviser Content, Uncertainty, and Prescriptions

The quantitative findings presented in this section strongly support an informational theory of bureaucracies, rather than a parochial theory. The four main variables in the analyses capture (1) bureaucracy via a binary indicator for State Department which proxies for foreign policy advisers; (2) advisory content measured with the continuous Content Text Score and binary Political score; (3) advisory Uncertainty based on the dictionary approach; and (4) advisory Aggressiveness using the three-level coding comparing the policy preferences of Defense and State officials.

Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is the primary method of analysis with standard errors clustered on the case. I present specifications without and with case fixed effects, which account for unobserved invariant components of each case.23 Models with fixed effects show how bureaucratic affiliation affects advisory input when holding the case fixed (say, to the Cuban Missile Crisis). Each bureaucracy thus assesses the same adversary at the same time. Differences between State and other bureaucracies are not attributable to underlying differences in the cases they participate in. All OLS models are bivariate because any case-level control variables are collinear with the fixed effects. To ensure that text-based measures reflect substance rather than noise, I limit the sample to the 167 bureaucracy-crisis observations with at least 100 words, though results are robust to using alternative cutoffs.24

State Department Officials Provide Political Information

The results presentation begins with Informational Theory Expectation 1, which contends that State Department officials are more likely to emphasize political attributes compared to counterparts from other bureaucracies. Non-overlapping functional responsibilities between the bureaucracies encourages comparative specialization. Tasked with conducting foreign policy, State Department officials specialize in an adversary’s political characteristics.

23To calculate clustered standard errors with fixed effects, I follow the advice in Cameron and Miller (2015). Each cluster in the data set has a small number of observations (maximum of five). For small clusters, Cameron and Miller (2015, p. 331) recommend the ‘within’ fixed effects estimator, rather than the dummy variable fixed effects estimator.

24Potential observations have insufficient text due to either limitations of the corpus or their lack of participation during crises.
I examine descriptive patterns before turning to regression results. Overall, advisory input skews toward military rather than political content with fewer than 30% of observations coded as political on the binary measure. This is unsurprising given that cases only qualify for inclusion if the president and senior advisers discuss the potential use of force. However, there is important heterogeneity among bureaucracies. State Department officials are twice as likely (46% vs. 23%) to discuss political content compared to officials from other bureaucracies.

Figure 3, further decomposes the data for each of the five bureaucracies. The left and right panels respectively show data for the Content Text Score and Political indicator measures. The left panel plots all observations with the solid diamonds showing mean score by bureaucracy. Beyond confirming State’s tendency to emphasize political content, the figures confirm another expectation: advisers in the Defense Department and JCS tend to emphasize military content. On the binary measure, members of the JCS strictly limit themselves to military content. CIA and NSC/White House officials occupy a middle ground.

Descriptive plots show that functional roles affect the type of information advisers provide to the president. Regressions confirm this conclusion. Table 2 reports results from specifications with content as the outcome variable and bureaucratic affiliation as the explanatory variable. Models
vary the outcome variable coding (continuous in 1-3, binary in 4-6), the inclusion of case fixed effects, and sampling criteria. Logistic regression for the binary outcome coding provides similar results (see SI). Models 3 and 6 prune the sample to only the ‘ideal’ type bureaucracies—State, Defense, and JCS. If the theory is correct that specialization dictates advisory content, then divergences should be especially pronounced within this subset. Again, models do not include control variables because variables measured at the case level (e.g., geographic proximity) are collinear with the fixed effects.

Table 2: Bureaucratic Role and Advisory Content

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Content Text Score</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Political</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Department</td>
<td>0.17***</td>
<td>0.11***</td>
<td>0.20***</td>
<td>0.23***</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.17***</td>
<td>-0.16***</td>
<td>-0.23***</td>
<td>0.23***</td>
<td>0.27***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations | 167 | 167 | 104 | 167 | 167 | 104
Case Fixed Effects | N | Y | Y | N | Y | Y
Only ‘Ideal’ Types | N | N | Y | N | N | Y
Outcome Mean | -0.12 | -0.12 | -0.14 | 0.29 | 0.29 | 0.29

*p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Notes: OLS with bureaucracy observations as unit of analysis. Standard errors clustered on the case. Fixed effects not shown for models that include them. Models 3 and 6 limit the sample to State, Defense, and JCS observations.

The State Department explanatory variable has a positive coefficient, indicating more political content, across all specifications. The relationship is statistically significant in all three models using the continuous content score. Whereas the average bureaucracy input concerns military content (Content Text Score= -0.12), State Department officials stress, on average, either neutral or political content (coefficients ≥ 0.11). This effect becomes more pronounced when restricting the comparison to Defense and JCS officials, as reported in Model 3. Consider the crisis sparked by North Korea shooting down an EC-121 reconnaissance plane. On average, bureaucracies had a Content Text Score of -0.15. The model predicts that State’s score would be -0.04, or substantially more balanced between military and political content. State’s actual input was even more skewed toward political matters with a score of 0.24. These patterns in the data accord with the historical
record. Defense officials focused on the advantages of possible airstrikes compared to mining North Korean harbors or establishing a blockade. In contrast, State officials considered Soviet reactions and likely North Korean responses to diplomatic overtures.

Using the binary outcome coding produces similar, though less robust results. In Model 4, moving from any other bureaucracy to the State Department doubles the probability of political content (23% points ± 14% at the 95% confidence interval). When including fixed effects, the substantive effect diminishes and is no longer statistically significant. However, when restricting the sample to the ideal types, I again find a strong and statistically significant effect. Further analysis confirms that while State Department provides the most political content, the divergence from CIA and NSC input is not enormous, at least when using the binary outcome coding and fixed effects. The result suggests that the latter two bureaucracies lie in the middle of the continuum of substantive assignments and can encroach upon or, more optimistically, contribute to the State Department’s substantive remit. Robustness checks in the SI address small sample size concerns using the diagnostic tests outlined in Gelman and Carlin (2014).

**State Department Officials Express More Uncertainty**

Information Theory Expectation 2 anticipates that State Department officials express greater uncertainty than their counterparts during advisory processes. Officials from State are more likely to discuss an adversary’s political attributes and these attributes tend to be more uncertain due to limited information.

Consistent with the expectation, *Uncertainty* is 10% higher in State Department observations compared to other agencies (5.6% vs. 5.1%). Decomposing the sample by bureaucracy and content yields additional insights, shown in Figure 4. First, State is the most uncertain of all five bureaucracies when averaging across the full sample (left panel of figure). JCS observations offer the starkest contrast with an average score below 4.5%. Second, content domain affects bureaucracies’ uncertainty (center and right panels). State Department officials, for example, express greater uncertainty when discussing political matters (6.0%), whereas their uncertainty when discussing military matters (5.4%) is comparable to that of other agencies. The pattern suggests that State Department officials are not inherently prone to greater uncertainty or wishy-washy input. Instead the bureaucracy’s uncertainty is notably high when, thanks to its domain expertise, it recognizes
informational blindspots regarding the adversary’s political traits.

Perhaps troublingly, those outside of State express a relatively high degree of certainty when they wade into political matters, at least compared to the specialists inside State. Political assessments from advisers speaking beyond their core competency may exhibit unwarranted certainty. The finding suggests that specialization in the political domain makes State Department officials aware of difficulties getting clarity on adversaries’ political traits. Additionally, competency widens the political-military uncertainty gap. When the ideal type bureaucracies—State, Defense, and JCS—discuss their areas of expertise, they provide dramatically different degrees of uncertainty as depicted in the shaded regions. Political traits are subject to greater uncertainty than military traits, as judged by those best equipped to evaluate them.

![Figure 4: Mean uncertainty score by bureaucracy.](image)

Figure 4: Mean uncertainty score by bureaucracy. Dashed horizontal line shows overall mean uncertainty. Diamonds in shaded regions indicate ideal type bureaucracies speaking in their area of expertise. Left, center, and right panels respectively plot all observations, observations discussing political content, and observations discussing military content.

Models 1 and 2 in Table 3 regress Uncertainty on the State Department indicator without and with case fixed effects. Fixed effects guard against the possibility that State officials are only participating in information-poor cases. Both specifications produce similar results: State officials express approximately 10% (± 10%) more uncertainty relative to other advisers. Deliberations before the 1965 intervention in the Dominican Republic help illuminate overall patterns. The average bureaucracy Uncertainty score was 6.0%. Regression results predict a State Department score
of 6.6%. In reality, State officials expressed even more uncertainty, producing a score of 7.3%, or a 20% relative increase over other bureaucracies. Documents from the crisis corroborate this pattern. Defense officials expressed limited doubt that two or fewer US divisions could stabilize the island. In contrast, State Department officials, attuned to political factions on the ground, conveyed a lack of certainty. Undersecretary of State Mann told Johnson that the “loyalties of the troops outside the capital are still uncertain.”

Table 3: Bureaucratic Role and Certainty

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State Department</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>1.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.29)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
<td>(0.39)</td>
<td>(0.60)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>5.10</td>
<td>5.10</td>
<td>4.83</td>
<td>4.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case Fixed Effects</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only ‘Ideal’ Types</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only ‘Expert’ Types</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome Mean</td>
<td>5.27</td>
<td>5.27</td>
<td>5.27</td>
<td>5.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Notes: OLS with bureaucracy observations as unit of analysis. Standard errors clustered on the case. Fixed effects not shown for models that include them. Models 3 and 4 limit the sample to ‘ideal’ types—State, Defense, and JCS observations. Model 4 further restricts the sample to ‘expert’ observations where an ‘ideal’ type discusses its area of expertise.

State’s relative uncertainty becomes even more pronounced when subsetting the sample to ideal-type bureaucracies. Model 3 presents results where Defense and JCS serve as the comparison set. Substantively, advisory input from State conveys 19% (±15%) more uncertainty than input from military advisers. Limiting the sample to ‘expert’ observations—i.e., State discusses political and Defense/JCS discuss military attributes—produces even larger substantive effects (27% ± 25%). See the SI for robustness checks assessing the implications of the relatively small sample size for effect magnitudes (Gelman and Carlin 2014).

25Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mann) and President Johnson, April 26, 1965, FRUS, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana, Document 22.
An alternative explanation for the results might suggest that individuals who select into the State Department systematically differ from others. Evidence suggests that they are more liberal (Clinton et al. 2012; Milner and Tingley 2015) and more likely to be generalized trusters (Rathbun 2012). This could drive the results if either characteristic makes individuals more prone to express uncertainty. Given the impossibility of randomly assigning senior advisers to different bureaucracies, I cannot definitively rule out this alternative. That said, it is telling that State Department officials are notably uncertain when assessing political attributes but not when assessing military attributes. It appears that recognition of informational scarcity on political traits, as opposed to something specific about pre-existing individual dispositions, drives the elevated uncertainty.

**Searching for Dovish Diplomats**

Are State Department officials less militarily aggressive than their civilian counterparts at Defense as the prevailing parochial theory contends? For Allison and Zelikow (1999, p. 307), “[k]nowledge of the organizational seat at the table yields significant clues about a likely stand.” In crises, however, I expect that parochial interests dissipate. Presidents wield tools—selection, sanction, and removal of advisers—that further encourage honest communication.

Consistent with my expectation, bureaucratic “seat” offers little insight into the policy positions that officials adopt. Table 4 shows the overall pattern. State and Defense advocate substantively indistinguishable positions in nearly half of the cases. In those cases with a difference, Defense and State are almost equally likely to assume the hawkish position. Civilians in the Office of the Secretary of Defense call for more aggressive actions in 30% of cases. Those at State are the more aggressive actor in 25% of cases. A variety of statistical tests confirm what the table makes immediate: State Department officials are not especially dovish. Whether treating the outcome codings as linear, ordinal, or categorical, all tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of no difference between the bureaucracies.

To an extent, aggressiveness depended upon who headed the bureaucracy. Cyrus Vance never adopted the most aggressive posture while in the Carter administration. His consistency is atypical though. Other secretaries varied depending on the context. Secretary of State Rogers, for instance, opposed bombing Cambodia in 1969 while Secretary of Defense Laird advocated, or at
Table 4: Counts of Relative Aggressiveness by Bureaucracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Defense</th>
<th>Similar</th>
<th>State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall Count</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One sample tests: p-values
- T-test: 0.61
- Wilcoxon: 0.61
- Chi-squared: 0.70

Notes: No test precludes the null hypothesis of no difference in hawkishness between the bureaucracies. T-test codes outcomes as 0, 1, and 2. “Similar” serves as median value for Wilcoxon test. The Chi-squared test assigns probabilities across the three categories of 25, 50, and 25.

least approved, it. Rogers and Laird flipped positions three years later. Laird strongly opposed using B-52s to bomb industrial complexes in Hanoi and Haiphong in late 1972 whereas Rogers consented to the Linebacker II bombing, albeit hesitantly. Little daylight existed between the State and Defense positions in the modal case. They advocated different but not discernibly more aggressive policies. Other times the position similarity followed naturally from close State-Defense collaboration, as occurred during the Berlin Wall crisis.

6 Discussion, Generalizability, and Implications

A foreign policy adviser—State Department official—can simultaneously emphasize political attributes, express uncertainty, and, on occasion, endorse hawkish policies. Highly-certain doves and uncertain hawks are not oxymoronic. Certainty and policy suggestions are potentially distinct components of advisory input. Convinced the adversary is militarily strong, doves support making policy concessions. Believing the adversary to be irresolute, even if uncertain in this judgment, hawks advise leaders to increase their demands on the adversary. Moreover, a focus on either political or military dimensions of the adversary is not determinative of policy recommendations.

Knowledge of political attributes encourages hawkish positions when the available information indicates the opponent is irresolute or easily displaced from power thanks to a sizable and unified domestic opposition.

Secretaries Rusk and Dulles offer examples of being attuned to the political dimension and simultaneously advocating hawkish positions. Rusk was not a Vietnam dove. From 1961 onwards he contributed to escalatory decisions. While advising aggressive policies he simultaneously interrogated the strength, viability, and resolve of leaders in Saigon. For both Diem and Khanh, Rusk questioned whether they were worth supporting and how to use military leverage to extract governance concessions from them (Pelz 1981; Freedman 1996). Months before the Tonkin Gulf incidents, Rusk said that “we do not go to war for a government which is more interested in quarreling than in fighting the Viet Cong.”

Dulles similarly stressed political considerations while also endorsing an aggressive policy regarding Lebanon in 1958. During an NSC meeting, he raised two political factors that would complicate a US intervention: Soviet and Arab responses (George and Smoke 1974). Evaluating foreign countries’ policy priorities, which affect their resolve over the issues at stake, calls for the State Department’s political judgment. Dulles answered the call yet still saw fit to have US troops land on Beirut’s beaches. Cognizance of political considerations does not imply an aversion to using force.

**Generalizability**

How generalizable are the findings? While an empirical answer is beyond the scope of this study, we can specify theoretical conditions needed for the implications to hold in other states and time periods.

The relevance of the theory minimally requires that a state’s leader or decision-making unit solicits information from multiple advisers. In addition to delegation, the theory requires differentiation among state bureaucracies. The ubiquity of military institutions and ministries of foreign affairs suggests the widespread presence of specialization between bureaucratic functions. Most countries satisfy this basic criteria. These commonalities notwithstanding, some theoretical conditions and assumptions are less likely to hold across differing institutional arrangements. First,

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states vary in the authority leaders have to select and sanction advisers. Leaders of coalition
governments in parliamentary democracies may not share preferences with senior advisers from
different parties and their ability to dismiss those advisers may be politically circumscribed. Con-
sequently, advisers may enjoy greater latitude to advance parochial bureaucratic interests even
during crisis deliberations. Second, multiple bureaucracies must enjoy access to the leader. If a
single institution dominates the information provision process, then affiliated advisers may not
stick to their areas of core competence. Regimes with civil-military balances that vastly privilege
the military might exhibit this tendency. Third, there must be a division of labor among bureaucra-
cies rather than overlapping responsibilities. The divide in advisory content (political vs. military)
likely shrinks as substantive congruence increases. The dramatic expansion of the US NSC over
the past four decades generates this kind of substantive overlap with other bureaucracies. NSC
staff numbers exploded from the mid-20s under Carter to an estimated 500 under Obama (Ries
2016, p. 32-35). Consequently, bureaucracies’ relative specializations may be less distinct in some
times and places compared to the Cold War-era United States.

**Implications for War and Peace**

I offer two conjectures on the implications of an informational theory of bureaucracies for crisis
outcomes. First, advisory input shapes leaders beliefs which affects the peaceful settlements they
deem preferable to war. Advisers thus serve as the conduit through which information about
adversaries moves from the international environment to leaders. The information they provide
shapes the bargaining strategies leaders adopt. Whether leaders judge an adversary more likely to
have high or low resolve reflects the information that advisers provide and affects how generous
leaders are at the negotiating table, which in turn affects the likelihood of conflict (Fearon 1995).

Second, the differentiation in specialization means a leader marginalizing a bureaucracy cre-
ates informational blindspots. Due to specialization, each bureaucracy offers a potentially unique
information. Curtailing any bureaucracy’s input leaves leaders with distorted, or at least incom-
plete, views of the strategic environments they face. In some cases, these distortions can con-
tribute to conflict. President Bush sidelined the State Department before the Iraq War, which ar-
guably contributed to his poor assessment of the prospects for postwar stability. This assessment
increased the apparent value of war, reducing the relative appeal of the status quo. President
Kennedy similarly marginalized his State Department advisers before authorizing the Bay of Pigs invasion. Relying on the plan’s architects from CIA, he believed widespread latent opposition to Castro would emerge in sympathy with the beachhead landing. This distorted belief inflated the operation’s expected value, again rendering the status quo less attractive on a relative basis. Specialization among bureaucracies mandates that leaders solicit input from each bureaucracy.

7 Conclusion

Leaders seek information during crises to optimize strategic choices that have the potential to lead to war. They look to senior advisers heading the state’s national security bureaucracies to provide that information. By expanding the analytical lens to encompass those at a leader’s side, this study develops an informational theory of bureaucracies. Bureaucracies matter during crises, but not in the way Allison contends. A division of labor fosters differentiated expertise and emphasis across advisers and their respective bureaucracies. Where you sit affects the type of information you collect and provide. Adopting a text-as-data approach, new measures show that foreign policy advisers (State Department officials) are twice as likely to emphasize the adversary’s political traits compared to counterparts from other bureaucracies. Because of differences in the content they emphasize, advisers differ in the uncertainty they express. While the platitude that uncertainty pervades international politics is largely sound, it is especially applicable when it comes to political (versus military) traits. Consistent with the expectation, diplomats convey greater uncertainty than peers in other bureaucracies within the corpus. Contrary to the canonical parochial view, bureaucratic position offers little insight into an adviser’s policy preferences. Across 61 Cold War crises, civilian officials from State and Defense adopt indistinguishable policy stances nearly half the time. In the other half, they are almost equally likely to be the hawkish voice.

Several avenues seem particularly fruitful for scholars to pursue in future work. Assessing whether these findings hold in other time periods or places would be valuable, particularly under different institutional regimes. Similarly, study of whether the dynamics identified during crises apply outside of them could reveal important scope conditions. More broadly, I document the information that advisers provide but not how leaders make sense of it all. Precisely how these
adviser-level inputs aggregate to form leader-level beliefs is a long-standing challenge in international relations theory and demands further inquiry (Powell 2017).

The findings offer several implications for the literatures on bureaucracies and informational theories of war. Across crises, “where you stand depends on where you sit” is a poor heuristic for analyzing advisory processes. A mapping from bureaucratic role to policy prescription may be appropriate in other contexts, such as long term strategic planning. However, it lacks an empirical basis during crises and is a dubious point of departure for future analyses of bureaucracy. Additionally, I unpack several elements underpinning informational accounts of war. Distinguishing between types of informational content, for instance along the lines of military versus political information, highlights differences along consequential dimensions such as the uncertainty attendant to each. Additionally, I delineate the process by which leaders typically collect and make use of the available information on their adversaries. Doing so is an essential step in the causal chain that links informational environments (e.g., complete or asymmetric) to leader beliefs to strategic choices and ultimately to war.

For policymakers, the findings speak to the danger of curtailing a bureaucracy’s involvement during advisory processes. Due to their comparative specializations, marginalizing any one institution can mean forfeiting unique information and expertise. Marginalization thus breeds informational blindspots. Emerging ignorant from cursory advisory processes, leaders risk blundering into conflict.
References


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