

Supporting Information for “Bureaucracies, Information, and International Crises: What You Know Depends on Where You Sit”

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1 Opportunities to Use Force: Coding and Sources for Hawkishness Variable

Chinese Offshore Islands <i>Year:</i> 1953 <i>Hawkish:</i> Similar	<i>Impetus:</i> PRC captures lesser islands and threatens the Tachens <i>Sources:</i> Corpus only
Korean War Armistice <i>Year:</i> 1953 <i>Hawkish:</i> Similar	<i>Impetus:</i> PRC-North Korean attack during settlement deliberations <i>Sources:</i> George and Smoke (1974) ; Dingman (1988) ; Crane (2000) ; Trachtenberg (1988) ; Ambrose (1984) ; Immerman (1998)
Soviet Nuclear Program <i>Year:</i> 1953 <i>Hawkish:</i> Defense	<i>Impetus:</i> US study of preventive attacks <i>Sources:</i> Trachtenberg (1988) ; Brands (1989a)
Dien Bien Phu <i>Year:</i> 1954 <i>Hawkish:</i> Similar	<i>Impetus:</i> Vietminh offensive against French positions <i>Sources:</i> Herring and Immerman (1984) ; Fair (1996) ; Ambrose (1984) ; Hoopes (1974)
Guatemala <i>Year:</i> 1954 <i>Hawkish:</i> State	<i>Impetus:</i> US sponsored and supported overthrow of Arbenz <i>Sources:</i> Moye (1998) ; Immerman (2010, 1980) ; Hove (2007) ; Immerman (1998)
Taiwan Straits I <i>Year:</i> 1954 <i>Hawkish:</i> State	<i>Impetus:</i> PRC bombards offshore islands <i>Sources:</i> George and Smoke (1974) ; Chang (1988)
Suez <i>Year:</i> 1956 <i>Hawkish:</i> Defense	<i>Impetus:</i> Nationalization prompts attack, prompting Soviet threat <i>Sources:</i> Warner (1991) ; Kingseed (1992)
Jordan I <i>Year:</i> 1957 <i>Hawkish:</i> Similar	<i>Impetus:</i> Pro-Egyptian/Syrian and leftist forces threaten Hussein <i>Sources:</i> George and Smoke (1974) ; Little (1995) ; Immerman (1998)
Syria <i>Year:</i> 1957 <i>Hawkish:</i> Similar	<i>Impetus:</i> Syrian shift toward Soviet bloc <i>Sources:</i> George and Smoke (1974) ; Blackwell (2000) ; Pearson (2007)
Taiwan Straits Turmoil <i>Year:</i> 1957 <i>Hawkish:</i> State	<i>Impetus:</i> Heavy PRC shelling of Quemoy island group <i>Sources:</i> Corpus only

Berlin Deadline Year: 1958 Hawkish: Similar	<i>Impetus:</i> Soviet ultimatum on Berlin's status and control <i>Sources:</i> George and Smoke (1974) ; Williamson (2010)
Indonesia Year: 1958 Hawkish: Defense	<i>Impetus:</i> Covert US efforts to change regime <i>Sources:</i> Kahin and Audrey (N.d.) ; Brands (1989b) ; Scott (1985)
Jordan II Year: 1958 Hawkish: Defense	<i>Impetus:</i> Threats to Hussein's regime <i>Sources:</i> Hahn (2006)
Lebanon Year: 1958 Hawkish: Similar	<i>Impetus:</i> Assassination of reformist editor and coup in Iraq <i>Sources:</i> George and Smoke (1974) ; Little (1996) ; Hoopes (1974) ; Ambrose (1984)
Taiwan Straits II Year: 1958 Hawkish: Similar	<i>Impetus:</i> PRC attacks offshore islands <i>Sources:</i> George and Smoke (1974) ; Gordon (1985)
Cuba Expropriation Year: 1960 Hawkish: Similar	<i>Impetus:</i> Soviet aid to Cuba and expropriations of US assets <i>Sources:</i> Corpus only
Bay of Pigs Year: 1961 Hawkish: Defense	<i>Impetus:</i> US sponsored landing/invasion of Cuba <i>Sources:</i> Schlesinger (1965) ; Wyden (1979) ; Higgins (1987)
Berlin Wall Year: 1961 Hawkish: Similar	<i>Impetus:</i> Challenge to freedom of movement in Berlin <i>Sources:</i> George and Smoke (1974) ; Smyser (2009) ; Gearson and Schake (2002)
Kuwait Year: 1961 Hawkish: Similar	<i>Impetus:</i> Iraqi threat to Kuwait's independence <i>Sources:</i> Joyce (1995) ; Winger (2012)
Pathet Lao Year: 1961 Hawkish: Defense	<i>Impetus:</i> Pathet Lao offensive <i>Sources:</i> Mahajani (1971) ; Warner (1994) ; Kochavi (2002)
Phuoc Vinh Year: 1961 Hawkish: Defense	<i>Impetus:</i> Vietcong attack on Phuoc Vinh <i>Sources:</i> Pelz (1981) ; Warner (1994)
Trujillo Year: 1961 Hawkish: Defense	<i>Impetus:</i> Assassination of Trujillo and domestic turmoil in DR <i>Sources:</i> Rabe (1996) ; Dauer (2005)

<p>China Arms Buildup Year: 1962 Hawkish: Similar</p>	<p><i>Impetus:</i> Large PRC military buildup in area of Taiwan <i>Sources:</i> Hilsman (1967)</p>
<p>Cuban Missile Crisis Year: 1962 Hawkish: State</p>	<p><i>Impetus:</i> US response to Soviet missiles in Cuba <i>Sources:</i> Allison and Zelikow (1999)</p>
<p>Nam Tha Year: 1962 Hawkish: State</p>	<p><i>Impetus:</i> Pathet Lao take region and threaten Thailand <i>Sources:</i> Wehrle (1998); Kochavi (2002)</p>
<p>Taiwan Return Year: 1962 Hawkish: Defense</p>	<p><i>Impetus:</i> Taiwan considers assault on mainland <i>Sources:</i> Kochavi (1996); Gordon (1985); Hilsman (1967)</p>
<p>Chinese Nuclear Program Year: 1963 Hawkish: Defense</p>	<p><i>Impetus:</i> US consideration of preventive strikes <i>Sources:</i> Burr and Richelson (2000)</p>
<p>Haiti Year: 1963 Hawkish: Similar</p>	<p><i>Impetus:</i> Duvalier instability and threat of communist influence <i>Sources:</i> Arthus (2014)</p>
<p>Yemen Year: 1963 Hawkish: Similar</p>	<p><i>Impetus:</i> Civil war in Yemen with broad regional involvement <i>Sources:</i> Bishku (1992); Little (1988); Smith (2000)</p>
<p>Congo Year: 1964 Hawkish: Similar</p>	<p><i>Impetus:</i> Revolution and hostage situation <i>Sources:</i> Odom (1988)</p>
<p>Cyprus I Year: 1964 Hawkish: Similar</p>	<p><i>Impetus:</i> Outbreak of inter-communal violence <i>Sources:</i> Wenzke and Lindley (2008); Brands Jr (1987); James (2002)</p>
<p>Laos I Year: 1964 Hawkish: Similar</p>	<p><i>Impetus:</i> Attempted coup and anti-aircraft firing on US planes <i>Sources:</i> Benson (2014)</p>
<p>Panama Flag Year: 1964 Hawkish: Defense</p>	<p><i>Impetus:</i> Riots in the canal zones <i>Sources:</i> Latham (2002); McPherson (2004)</p>
<p>Tonkin Gulf Year: 1964 Hawkish: Similar</p>	<p><i>Impetus:</i> Reported attack on US ships <i>Sources:</i> Ball (1991); Moise (1996)</p>

<p>Dominican Republic Year: 1965 Hawkish: State</p>	<p><i>Impetus:</i> Government overthrown and civil conflict <i>Sources:</i> McPherson (2003); Brands (1987); Draper (1971); Palmer Jr (2015)</p>
<p>Pleiku Year: 1965 Hawkish: Defense</p>	<p><i>Impetus:</i> Attack on Camp Holloway in Vietnam <i>Sources:</i> Freedman (1996); Milne (2007); Greenstein and Burke (1989)</p>
<p>Six Day War Year: 1967 Hawkish: State</p>	<p><i>Impetus:</i> Preemptive Israeli strike and Soviet threat of intervention <i>Sources:</i> Quandt (1992); Lazarowitz (2008)</p>
<p>Czechoslovakia Year: 1968 Hawkish: Similar</p>	<p><i>Impetus:</i> Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia <i>Sources:</i> Valenta (1979); Prozumenshchikov (2010)</p>
<p>USS Pueblo Year: 1968 Hawkish: Similar</p>	<p><i>Impetus:</i> North Korea seizes US naval ship <i>Sources:</i> Houghton (2015); Mobley (2001); Lerner (2001); Lamb (1984)</p>
<p>Tet Offensive Year: 1968 Hawkish: State</p>	<p><i>Impetus:</i> Offensive against US and allied forces in Vietnam War <i>Sources:</i> Sigelman and McNeil (1980); Khong (1992)</p>
<p>Cambodia Bombing Year: 1969 Hawkish: Defense</p>	<p><i>Impetus:</i> North Vietnam spring offensive and US response <i>Sources:</i> McMahon (2010)</p>
<p>Korea EC-121 Year: 1969 Hawkish: Similar</p>	<p><i>Impetus:</i> North Korea shoots down US reconnaissance plane <i>Sources:</i> Sarantakes (2017); Simmons (1978)</p>
<p>Black September Year: 1970 Hawkish: Similar</p>	<p><i>Impetus:</i> Syria invades Jordan, threatening Hussein <i>Sources:</i> Garfinkle (1985); Van Atta (2008); Kissinger (2011)</p>
<p>Cambodia Invasion Year: 1970 Hawkish: State</p>	<p><i>Impetus:</i> US expands ground operations into Cambodia <i>Sources:</i> Drivas (2011)</p>
<p>Cienfuegos Year: 1970 Hawkish: Defense</p>	<p><i>Impetus:</i> Soviet submarine base in Cuba <i>Sources:</i> Crall and Martin (2013)</p>
<p>Cuban Shipping Year: 1971 Hawkish: Similar</p>	<p><i>Impetus:</i> Cuban seizure of commercial ships <i>Sources:</i> Corpus only</p>

Laos II Year: 1971 Hawkish: Defense	<i>Impetus:</i> US expands bombing into Laos <i>Sources:</i> Corpus only
Christmas Bombing Year: 1972 Hawkish: State	<i>Impetus:</i> North Vietnam rejects diplomatic efforts <i>Sources:</i> Warner (2014)
Ports Mining Year: 1972 Hawkish: State	<i>Impetus:</i> Easter Offensive and response in Vietnam War <i>Sources:</i> Randolph (2009)
Arab Israeli War Year: 1973 Hawkish: State	<i>Impetus:</i> Egypt attacks Israel, threat of Soviet intervention <i>Sources:</i> Rabinovich (2007) ; Dinitz (1999) ; Sagan (1979)
Libya Year: 1973 Hawkish: Defense	<i>Impetus:</i> Libya attacks US reconnaissance flights <i>Sources:</i> Corpus only
Cyprus II Year: 1974 Hawkish: Similar	<i>Impetus:</i> Turkey invades Cyprus <i>Sources:</i> Wenzke and Lindley (2008) ; Constandinos (2009) ; Slengesol (2000)
Angola Year: 1975 Hawkish: State	<i>Impetus:</i> Large Soviet-back MPLA offensive <i>Sources:</i> Noer (1993)
Mayaguez Year: 1975 Hawkish: State	<i>Impetus:</i> Khmer Rouge seize US cargo ship <i>Sources:</i> Lamb (1984) ; Snyder and Diesing (1977)
Saigon Fall Year: 1975 Hawkish: State	<i>Impetus:</i> Fall of Saigon and evacuation of US personnel <i>Sources:</i> Corpus only
Uganda Year: 1977 Hawkish: Similar	<i>Impetus:</i> Amin holds all US citizens <i>Sources:</i> Carter (2010)
Iran Revolution Year: 1978 Hawkish: Defense	<i>Impetus:</i> Domestic challenges to US-supported Shah <i>Sources:</i> Moens (1991)
Shaba II Year: 1978 Hawkish: Similar	<i>Impetus:</i> Katangan rebels invade Zaire, threatening US citizens <i>Sources:</i> Odom (1993)

Afghanistan

Year: 1979

Hawkish: Similar

Impetus: Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

Sources: [Hartman \(2002\)](#); [Brzezinski \(1983\)](#); [Vance \(1983\)](#)

Cuba Soviet Brigade

Year: 1979

Hawkish: Similar

Impetus: US intelligence identifies Soviet Brigade in Cuba

Sources: [Brzezinski \(1983\)](#)

Iran Hostage

Year: 1979

Hawkish: Defense

Impetus: Storming of US embassy and holding US citizens hostage

Sources: [Smith \(1985\)](#); [Glad \(1989\)](#)

2 Adviser Content Measures and Validation

For classifying a text’s content as political or military, the goal of the supervised learning method is to estimate the probability that text T belongs to the military class M , given the words in T . By Bayes’ Rule, this desired quantity $P(M | T)$ is equal to $\frac{P(T|M)P(M)}{P(T)}$. Let $P(T | M)$ be the independent product over all $P(w_i | M)$ where w_i represents each word in text T . The independence assumption is clearly wrong; words used in a text are highly correlated. Nonetheless, Naive Bayes provides accurate classifications despite the assumption violation. I use the observed words frequencies in the training set to estimate $P(w_i | M)$. With substitution, we can rewrite the original equation as $P(M | T) = \frac{P(M)}{P(T)} \prod_i P(w_i | M)$. Because texts are either military or not (in which case they are political), we can similarly write $P(M' | T) = \frac{P(M')}{P(T)} \prod_i P(w_i | M')$. Following Nielsen (N.d.), I put these two quantities together to generate a log likelihood ratio which serves as the raw text score:

$$\text{Raw Text Score} = \sum_i \log \frac{P(w_i|M')^{w_i}}{P(w_i|M)^{w_i}}.$$

This raw score is divided by the number of words in text T to generate the continuous *Content Text Score* which maps onto the binary *Political* measures, coding texts as 1 if positive and 0 otherwise.

Beyond the discussion in the manuscript, several additional metrics help validate the approach. As noted on inter-coder reliability, a research assistant produced identical codings for 82% of training set texts with Cohen’s kappa= 0.65. Table A2 shows the full confusion matrix.

Table A2: Inter-coder Confusion Matrix

		Coder 2	
		<i>political</i>	<i>military</i>
Coder 1	<i>political</i>	175	8
	<i>military</i>	76	216

For the 10-fold cross-validation, F -scores extend beyond accuracy (88%), incorporating other metrics such as precision and recall. For classifying military texts, precision and recall respectively refer to the fraction of documents classified as military that were hand coded as military and the fraction of the hand coded military texts that were classified as military texts. The F -score is 0.90.

Finally, the cross-validation exercise generates text scores for each document in the excluded set. Figure A1 plots each text’s score on the x-axis and its hand coded classification on the y-axis. Beyond high accuracy (solid points as a fraction of all points), the figure shows that inaccurate classifications were rarely far off the mark, instead clustering around the dashed vertical line at 0. The solid line plots fitted values from a bivariate logistic regression. Its steepness further attests to the classifier’s ability to discriminate between military and political texts.




Figure A1: Cross-validation results. Dashed vertical line indicates *Raw Text Score* = 0.

3 Example Training Set Documents

Military Texts

Example 1: Ground Attacks on Base Camps in Cambodia: Attached at Tab A is a brief summary of the two options for ground attacks on enemy base camps in Cambodia submitted by General Abrams on March 30. In developing plans for potential operations against enemy base areas, General Abrams was asked to consider two possibilities: An attack against targets of high military priority which could involve the use of US forces if necessary. Any other operation which would reduce the necessity of the involvement of US forces. With respect to military priority, MACV considered an attack on Base Area 352/353 (COSVN Hq) to be the most lucrative. He made the following significant points about this base area.¹

Example 2: The Chiefs believe that ground action against the North Vietnamese effort is adequate to reverse the situation. Air strikes on the three targets are not necessary from a military point of view. However, a South Vietnamese attack on their target is acceptable.²

Political Texts

Example 1: Iran. The two leading US academic experts on Iran, James Bill and Marvin Zonis, recently were debriefed in the Department following their separate visits to Iran at the end of November. In a wide range of Iranian contacts, both men found intense rage against the Shah personally. This is a marked change from the past when Iranians were content to blame their troubles on the Government and the Shah's advisers. Both professors see a slim chance that the Shah might retain a minimal role as constitutional monarch, but only if he moves quickly to negotiate a political compromise. They assess the opposition as very strong and extremely well-organized. Everywhere they found an eagerness for the US to play a decisive role in promoting a political solution to Iran's crisis.³

Example 2: In spite of economic difficulties there is no solid evidence that Trujillo's fall is imminent. Trujillo rules by force and will presumably remain in power as long as the armed forces continue to support him. While there is evidence of dissatisfaction on the part of a few officers there is as yet no cogent evidence of large-scale defection within the officer corps. The underground opposition to Trujillo composed of business, student and professional people is believed to be predominantly anti-Communist. They have substantially increased in numbers in recent years but have been unable to move effectively against Trujillo. In addition to opposition groups in the Dominican Republic, there are numerous exile groups located principally in Venezuela, Cuba, United States and Puerto Rico. In some cases these groups have been infiltrated by pro-Castro or pro-Communist elements.⁴

¹Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, April 27, 1970, *FRUS*, Volume VI, Vietnam, January 1969-July 1970, Document 264.

²Summary Notes of the 546th Meeting of the National Security Council, February 7, 1965, *FRUS*, Volume II, Vietnam, January-June 1965, Document 80.

³Memorandum from Warren Christopher to President Carter, December 1978, National Security Archive (NLC-00-158).

⁴Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy, February 15, 1961, *FRUS*, Volume XII, American Republics, Document 302.

4 Adviser Uncertainty Measures and Validation

Below is a sample text with the uncertainty dictionary words italicized.

Ball and Thompson believe that the Chinese decision to intervene on the ground would, in the final analysis, *probably depend* largely on the extent to which Peiping felt assured of Soviet support. There is no way that we can safely predict *whether* or not such support would be forthcoming. They are convinced, *however*, that the *risks* of Chinese ground intervention would be great and the costs of such intervention tremendous—particularly since the very taking of this step by Peiping would presumably imply substantial Soviet involvement, *perhaps* even to the point of a large-scale Soviet-US confrontation.⁵

Dictionary methods are more difficult to validate than supervised learning approaches because there is no analogue to *k*-fold cross-validation (Grimmer and Stewart 2013). I adopt two approaches. The first hand codes a subset of all documents (roughly 5%) from the corpus into three levels of uncertainty. These human codings strongly correlate (53%) with the dictionary method uncertainty scores.

The second approach leverages texts where there are clear expectations for the *relative* degree of uncertainty. For instance, during the EC-121 incident Defense Secretary Laird wrote to Nixon suggesting that the JCS was overly certain in its estimate of what outcome US forces could impose on North Korea. He wrote, “If U.S. losses occur in the strike (and I believe there is more chance they may than the JCS papers indicate)...”⁶ Laird’s memo should, and does, register a higher uncertainty score than the JCS communications (6.2% vs. 2.6%). I repeat the exercise with two texts from during the Pleiku crisis in 1965. Thomas Hughes, Director of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, was dismayed by an earlier memo from McGeorge Bundy. In Bundy’s memo concerning probable reactions to escalated US bombing in Vietnam, he understated the risk of bombing actions by ignoring probable Chinese reactions. Chinese intervention or support for the North Vietnamese would amount to greater enemy military capabilities and thus is an added source of uncertainty. Hughes writes:

Incomprehensibly to me, the White House memorandum discusses the risks of sustained US air strikes against North Vietnam without examining Chinese Communist responses. However, the two intelligence community products estimate Chinese Communist air intervention to be quite likely at some stage in this very process.⁷

Again, the measure appropriately identifies Hughes’ memo to be more uncertain than Bundy’s memo (uncertainty scores of 7.7% and 5.3% respectively).

Another validity check compares uncertainty scores of those with historically well-known assessments. For instance, George Ball is widely thought to have been uncertain about what outcomes the US could secure through force in Vietnam. Walt Rostow, in contrast, was an adamant believer that North Vietnamese resolve was limited and the continued application of force would prove effective. Consistent with expectations, the uncertainty score for Ball (5.4%) is higher than that for Rostow (4.6%).

⁵Memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Ball to President Johnson, February 13, 1965, *FRUS*, Volume II, Vietnam, January-June 1965, Document 113.

⁶Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon, April 18, 1969, *FRUS*, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969-1972, Document 17.

⁷Memorandum from the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Acting Secretary of State Ball, February 8, 1965, *FRUS*, Volume II, Vietnam, 1964-1968, Document 90. Note that this document is not addressed to the president and is therefore only used for validation purposes.

5 Robustness Checks for Informational Theory Expectations 1 and 2

Sample size concerns. Statistically significant results from underpowered studies are often inflated and may even point in the wrong direction. Models employ a maximum of 167 observations. To address this possibility for Expectation 1 linking bureaucratic affiliation to substantive advisory content, I employ the diagnostic tests outlined in [Gelman and Carlin \(2014\)](#) for Model 2 from Table 2 in the main text. Conditional on the realized effect being true, there is an over 95% chance that we would observe a statistically significant effect. Moreover, effect magnitude inflation is minimal (2.5%). It is unlikely that the relationship between bureaucratic role and advisory content emerges due to a limited sample size. I repeat the exercise for Expectation 2 concerning bureaucratic position and adviser uncertainty. The diagnostics suggest these results, presented in Table 3, merit a more cautious interpretation. Using Model 3 as a benchmark, a true effect of that size would produce statistically significant findings 67% of the time. Results that are statistically significant will, on average, be inflated by 22%. While results point in the expected direction across model specifications, the analysis would surely benefit from additional studies bringing more observations to bear.

Binary outcome variable. I present logit specifications for models using the dichotomous *Political* content variable as an outcome.

Table A3: Expectation 1. Logistic regression (as opposed to OLS) for binary content measure; analogous to Models 4-6 in Table 2.

	<i>Political</i>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
State Department	1.06*** (0.36)	1.11 (0.68)	4.23*** (1.48)
Constant	-1.23*** (0.22)	0.21 (0.94)	-2.50 (2.06)
Observations	167	167	104
Case Fixed Effects	N	Y	Y
Only 'Ideal' Types	N	N	Y

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Notes: Logistic regression with bureaucracy observations as unit of analysis. Fixed effects not shown for models that include them. Model 3 limits the sample to State, Defense, and JCS observations.

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